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STATEMENT OE THE CASE 
This case involves a real estate transaction between Darren and Jacqueline Kuhn ("Kuhns") 
and Roger and Francis Schei ("Scheis") and their relationship and dealings withthe real estate agents 
employed by the Kuhns and the Scheis. The Scheis and Darren Kuhn ("Kuhn") are the Plaintiffs in 
the underlying matter. The Defendants in the underlying matter were either agents or brokers 
employed by Landmark Coldwell Banker or the brokerage itself except for Ronald Bitlon and 
Professional Escrow Services, who are not appealing in this matter. The Kuhns owned a house on 
Mountain Park Road in Chubbuck, Idaho ("Mountain Park Property"). Pl's. Compl. R. Vol. I, p. 30. 
They desired to purchase a house Schei constructed on Manning Lane ("Manning Lane Property"). 
Id. In order to facilitate the purchase of the Manning Lane Property by the Kuhns, the Scheis entered 
into a lease agreement for the Kuhns' Mountain Park house. Id. at 34. The Scheis agreed to lease 
the Mountain Park Property until it could be sold as the Scheis could not obtain financing to 
purchase the property outright. Id. Eventually, the Scheis stopped paying the rent and walked away 
from the Mountain Park Property in violation of the lease agreement and the purchase and sale 
agreement on the Manning Lane house. See id. at 39. 
The Scheis and Kuhns filed the underlying lawsuit after the mortgage holder foreclosed on 
the Kuhns' Mountain Park house. See generally id. at 27-44. The mortgage was in default because 
the Scheis discontinued the lease payments they were making on the Mountain Park home. 
Defendants were all real estate agents hired by Plaintiffs to sell the properties in question and were 
employedunder Coldwell Banker Landmark(hereinafier "Defendants"). See Def.'s Answer R. Vol. 
I, p. 54. They received only the commission paid for the purchase by the Kuhns of the Manning 
Lane Property. As the Mountain Park Property never was sold, no commission was ever paid on that 
transaction. Pl's. Compl. R. Vol. I, p. 39 
This case arose out of a claim by the Respondents that Appellants committed negligence, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud, causing financial damages to Respondents. See generally id. at 
27-44. Specifically, the Scheis and Darren Kuhn' claimed that the Defendants altered documents 
after they were signed by the Respondents, improperly obtained an appraisal for the property on 
Manning Lane, demanded a commission on Mountain Park where one was not earned, signed a lease 
without authority, and insisted on a listing where one was not required. Respondents claimed that 
these acts caused them financial losses. Id. 
Respondents put on evidence in support of these allegations and Appellants put on evidence 
to rebut those claims. As to liability, Appellants' evidence focused on Respondents' inability to 
prove that the documents were altered by the Defendants, that acommission was paid as to Mountain 
Park, or that the Defendants lacked authority to sign the lease. See discussion infva Part 1V.B. 1. As 
to damages, the Defendants' evidence focused on the Respondents' inability to prove that the 
Defendants' conduct caused any damages to Kuhn or the Scheis. Additionally, the evidence showed 
other reasonable likely causes for Respondents' damages. See id. 
The matter was tried in a lengthy trial before a jury. The jury came back with a verdict 
finding liability and awarding Darren Kuhn $748,746.68 in total damages including $558,088.00 in 
punitive damages. R. Vol. 11, page 307-314. The jury awarded the Scheis $453,163.18 in total 
damages including $364,035.00 in punitive damages. Id. 
Following the verdict, among other post-verdict motions filed by all parties, the Defendants 
filed motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion for a new trial, and a motion for 
remittitur along with motions for relief pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). R. Vol. 111, 
page 529-531 and 557-558. Pursuant to the Appellants' motion and the fact that the jury found 
Appellant's only ninety percent and eighty-seven percent responsible, the award to each for their 
negligence claims were reduced. R. Vol. IV, page 866(e)-(g). Also following the jury verdict, Kuhn 
and the Scheis moved the court for attorney's fees and costs, which motion was granted. R. Vol. IV, 
'Darren Kuhn's ex-wife Jacqueline Kuhn was not a Plaintiff or even a witness in the trial 
of this matter. 
page 866(k)-(s). Appellants have now timely appealed as set out in the Notice of Appeal and in the 
Issues Presented on Appeal below. R. Vol. IV, page 871-875. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in allowing Respondents to use what amounted to a liability 
expert? 
2. Did the District Court err in allowing Respondents' amendment for punitive damages and 
were the punitive damages awarded by the jury excessive? 
3. Did the District Court err in denying any of Appellants' Post Verdict Motions? 
4. Did the District Court err in its rulings on various evidentiary issues? 
5. Did the District Court err in allowing certain jury instructions while refusing others? 
6. Did the District Court err in the amount of attorney's fees it awarded? 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review 
As the appeal in this matter covers a broad range of issues, a different standard of review will 
apply to each individual matter appealed by the Defendants. The matters will be taken in the same 
order presented below in the body of this brief and in the same order as appealed in Appellants' 
Notice of Appeal. See R. Vol. N, page 871-874. The first matter in Appellants' Notice of Appeal 
is in regards to testimony allowed by Judge McDermott from an expert witness regarding the liability 
of the Defendants. The standard of review with regard to admission of evidence is clear from case 
law. "Trial courts have broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial, and their decision to 
admit such evidence will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. The 
same standard applies to the admission of expert testimony." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,564 
(2004). 
Defendants' appeal with regard to the award of punitive damages is twofold. First, the 
Defendants argue that the Scheis and Kuhn should not have been allowed to proceed with their claim 
of punitive damages at all. R. Vol. IV, page 872. The appropriate standard of review for an appeal 
of a district court's allowing an amendment to the complaint to allow for punitive damages is abuse 
of discretion. See Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313,319 (2008). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has fouild that in reviewing such a decision for abuse of discretion, it should abide 
by the following: 
When reviewing a trial court decision for abuse of discretion, the 
sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. 
Id. 
Whether or not the award of punitive damages is excessive or is a violation of due process is met 
with a different standard. For constitutionality questions, the Hall court opined that"the standard 
of review applicable to questions of law is one of deference to factual findings, but [the court] freely 
exarnine[s] whether statutory and constitutional requirements have been met in light of the facts as 
found? Id. at 320. 
Next, the Defendants have appealed the district court's rulings with regard to their post- 
verdict motions. R. Vol. N, page 872. The Defendants made a number of post verdict motions, 
which require a different standard of review from this court. One of those motions was a 60(b) 
motion. In determining the appropriate standard of review for a denial of a motion for relief under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court must consider what subsection of the rule the appellants 
are invoking. The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed this issue and reasoned as follows: 
Rule 60(b) enunciates a variety of grounds upon which relief from a 
judgment may be obtained. Some grounds- such as mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect under subsection (b)(l) 
allow discretionary relief. Others, such as the voidness of a judgment 
under subsection (b)(4), create a nondiscretionary entitlement to relief 
. . . Where discretionary grounds are invoked the standard of review 
is abuse of discretion. Where nondiscretionary grounds are asserted, 
the question presented is one of law upon which the appellate court 
exercises free review. 
Knight Insurance, Inc. v. Knight, I09 Idaho 56, 59,704 P.2d 960,963 (Ct. App 1985). 
Appellants appealed under rule 60(b)(3), which is likely an abuse of discretions standard. 
The next post-verdict motion from which the Defendants appeal is a Motion to Alter or 
Amend aJudgment. The Idaho Court of Appeals has found that this is an appealable issue, but "only 
on the question of whether there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 
259,263 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Defendants next appeal the denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. With regard to judgments notwithstanding the verdict, courts review the motionsde novo 
"The standard of review of a grant or denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
is the same as that of the trial court whenruling on the motion." Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772,774 
(2009) (citing Horner v. SaniTop, Inc., 143 Idaho 230,233 (2006)). That standard will be set out 
more completely in the body of this brief, but such a motion will be denied "if there is evidence of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar 
conclusion to that of the jury." Id. 
The Defendants' motion for new trial was also denied below and Appellants appeal from that 
decision as well. The standard of review for seeking a reversal on appeal of a denial of a motion for 
new trial is well settled. Due to the trial court having actually heard the evidence presented, its 
"grant or denial of such motions must be upheld unless the court has manifestly abused the wide 
discretion vested in it." Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599,602 (2003). 
The next issue for appeal is with regard to evidentiiuy issues in general. The standard for 
such a motion has already been set out above with regard to Defendants' appeal of the trial court's 
rulings regarding admission of testimony of expert witnesses. No further information should be 
required with regard to the standard of review for similar evidentiary issues. 
Next, the Defendants' appeal the appropriateness of selected jury instructions. The Appellate 
Courts exercise free review in determining the correctness of a trial court's jury instructions. 
Vanderford Co, Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,552 (2007). "The standard of review of whether 
a jury instruction should or should not have been given, is whether there is evidence at trial to 
support the instruction." Id. (citing Craig Johnson Constr., LLC v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 
Idaho 797,800 (2006)). 
Finally Appellants have appealed the award of Attorney's fees and the amount of the award. 
To the extent the award of attorney's fees "depends on the interpretation of a statute, the standard 
of review for statutory interpretation applies." Neighbors for Responsible Growth v. Kootenai 
County, 147 Idaho 173, 176 (2009). In that case, it is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. Id. However, otherwise, "the awarding of attorney fees and costs is within 
the discretion of the trial court and subject to review for an abuse of discretion." Smith v. Mitton, 
140 Idaho 893, 897 (2004). Further, a district court's "determination of a reasonable amount of 
attorney fees is a factual determination to which this court applies an abuse of discretion standard." 
Id. at 902. 
ZL The Diktrict Court abused its discretion in allowing Respondents' Expert Witness to Test@ 
as to whether or not Appellants' Conduct was Outrageous. 
It has been held in Idaho that an expert witness may net testify regardingthe standard of care 
of a real estate agent. In Rockefeller v. Grabow , 136 Idaho 637 (2001), the court heard a case 
revolving around the fiduciary duty a real estate agent owes to his or her client. The district court 
refused to allow testimony from an expert witness regarding the standard of care of a real estate 
agent. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, opining that: 
The threshold test for the admission of expert testimony is whether 
the scientific, or other specialized knowledge of the expert will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue. See I.R.E. 702. The function of the expert is to provide 
testimony on subjects that are beyond the common sense, experience 
and education of the average juror. Where the normal experience 
and qualifications of lay jurors permit them to draw proper 
conclusions from given facts and circumstances, then expert 
conclusions or opinions are inadmissible. . . . The standard of care of 
an agent is clearly established by prior case law of this Court. As an 
agent, [Defendant] owed the [Plaintiffs] a duty of loyalty, good faith 
and fair dealing. Although the facts of this case are different from 
previous cases, the jury could readily apply the facts to the legal 
standard without the assistance of expert testimony. 
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637,647 (2001) (citations omitted). 
Again, as is the case here, though the facts of the case differ, the jury could readily apply the facts 
to the legal standard without the assistance of expert testimony. 
In this matter, while the expert, Ms. Manning was not allowed to testify as to the standard 
of care, she was allowed to testify as to whether or not the conduct of the Defendants was 
outrageous. Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2561,l. 6 - p. 2562,l.S; See also Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2620, 1. 9-24. 
Outrageous conduct is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "conduct so extreme that it exceeds all 
reasonable bounds of human decency." Black's Law Dictionary, "Outrageous Conduct" (8' ed. 
2004). In ruling that an expert was necessary to assist the jury in its determination as to whether the 
Appellants' conduct was outrageous, the court ruled in effect that the jury was not competent to rule 
on the reasonable bounds of human decency. On that, no jury needs assistance from an expert 
witness. And surely an expert witness with regard to real estate transactions is not qualified to testify 
as to what the reasonable bounds of human decency are. 
Additionally, allowing the expert to testify as to whether or not she felt the conduct of the 
Defendants was outrageous allowed the expert to testify indirectly to what the court already ruled 
she could not testify to directly. Indeed, if the conduct was so egregious that it left the bounds of 
human decency, it must also not be in good faith as required by the law for real estate agents. 
Actions outside the bounds of honesty, good faith and fair dealing are like a subset of actions outside 
the bounds of human decency. It is akin to disallowing expert testimony in a car accident case on 
whether or not the expert believes that the defendant was negligent, but allowing that same expert 
7 
to testify as to whether or not the defendant was grossly negligent. 
If the jury inRockefellerwas allowed to decide whether or not the real estate agent breached 
his fiduciary duty to his clients, it follows that the jury in the case at hand should also be allowed to 
have so much trust placed in it. In allowing the expert witness to testify as to whether or not she 
believed the Defendants' conduct to be outrageous or not, the district court abused its discretion. 
Not only is that a decision that should be made by a jury without the input of an expert, but it in 
effect allowed the expert to testify that she thought the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty as 
well. 
IIL The District Court Erred in its Rulings Regarding Punitive Damages both as to their 
being Allowed to be Argued to the July and as to Allowing them to Stand Despite their 
Excessiveness. 
It is the contention of the Appellants that the District Court erred in its allowing Kuhn and 
the Scheis to move forward with their punitive damages claims and that the amount awarded by the 
jury was unconscionable. 
A. The Respondents should not have been allowed to proceed with their claim for 
punitive damages at trial. 
Idaho Code $6-1604 govems claims for punitive damages, and provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) In any action seeking recovery of punitive damages, the claimant 
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, oppressive, 
fraudulent, wanton, malicious or outrageous conduct by the party 
against whom the claim for punitive damages is asserted. 
(2) In all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted, no 
claim for damages shall be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking 
punitive damages. However, a party may, pursuant to a pretrial 
motion and after hearing before the court, amend the pleadings to 
include aprayer for relief seeking punitive damages. The court shall 
allow the motion to amend the pleadings if the moving party 
establishes at such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at 
trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. A prayer for 
relief added pursuant to this section shall not be barred by lapse of 
time under any applicable limitation on the time in which an action 
may be brought or claim asserted, if the time prescribed or limited 
had not expired when the original pleading was filed.2 
One of the leading cases in Idaho on punitive damages is Cheney v. Pales Verde Inv. Corp., 
104 Idaho 897 (1983). In Cheney, the Idaho Supreme Court stated the following: 
Mindful of the purpose of punitive damage awards, we note that they 
are not favored in the law and therefore, should be awarded only in 
the most unusual and compelling circumstances. Hatfield v. M a  
Rouse & Sons Northwest, supra; Jolly v. Paraguay, supra See also 
Yacht ClubSales &Sewice, Inc., supra; Jolly, supra; Linscott, supra; 
Cox, supra, as holding that the policy behind punitive damages is 
deterrence rather than punishment. An award of punitive damages 
will be sustained on appeal only when it is shown that the defendant 
acted in a manner that was 'an extreme deviation from reasonable 
standards of conduct, and that the act was performed by the 
defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its likely 
consequences.' HatJield v. M a  Rouse & Sons Northwest, supra, 
100 Idaho at 851, 606 P.2d at 955. See Linscott, supra. The 
justification for punitive damages must be that the defendant 
acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether the state 
be termed 'malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence' ... 
(citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 
104 Idaho at 904-905. Therefore, to establish a claim for punitive damages, the Respondents had 
to show that the Defendants' actions were ''an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of 
conduct" and that they acted "with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether the state be termed 
malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence." Id. 
The evidence set forth in the trial of this matter did not establish such deviant behavior as to 
2 Since the verdict in this case came down, there have been some changes to the law 
regarding punitive damages. It must now be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and there 
is now a limit on punitive damages that can be awarded. The statute as cited here is in the form it 
was in at the time of the trial. 
allow a claim for punitive damages to proceed, As discussed below regarding the denial of 
Appellants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, there is not sufficient evidence for 
the jury to find the way it did. There was no real evidence of fraud and certainly nothing that could 
rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence. All alleged fraudulent statements were orally 
made and, as set forth below, required a writing pursuant to the Statute of Frauds. See discussion 
Inpa, part IV.C.3. 
B. The Court should have found the punitive damages awarded by the jury in th& 
matter excessive and unconstitutional. 
Defendants contend that the excessiveness of the punitive damage award requires a remand. 
To determine whether a punitive damage award is excessive, the Court must ascertain whether the 
punitive damage award appears to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
Gri# Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315,322 (2003). "Proportionality" is a factor to be 
considered in evaluating whether a punitive award is excessive. Id. In GrifJ; the Supreme Court held 
that apunitive damage award of $93,497.00 was not disproportionate to the compensatory award of 
$445,124.00. It fkther held that although the punitive damage award constituted a significant 
amount (48.65%) of the defendant's 1999 assets, it would not be set aside because the defendant had 
transferred assets to third parties to reduce its net worth. Id. 
In this case, the punitive damage awards not only are disproportionate to the compensatory 
awards, they are also disproportionate to the parties' net income. The punitive damage award for 
Kuhn ($558,088) is 3 10% of the compensatory award against these defendants for Kuhn ($179,219). 
The punitive damage award for Scheis ($364,035) is 430% of the compensatory award against these 
defendants for Scheis ($84,483). Todd Bohn's net income for 1998 was $12,180 from the sales of 
homes. P1. Ex. 65. For 1999, he had net income of $13,883 from the sales of homes. For 2000, he 
had net income of $1 8,382 from the sale of homes. That is a total of $44,445 for the years involved. 
R. P1. Ex. 65. The punitive damages award against him for the Scheis and Kuhn was $63,750. He 
has to been ordered to pay more in punitive damages than he made in nit income. Thk pkitive 
damages against Bohn was 143% of his net income. John Merzlock testified that his net income 
from all sources was less than $75,000 per year. R. Vol. IV, p. 3631,l. 15-16. Only a portion of that 
amount was from the sales of homes. The punitive damages assessed against Merzlock were 
$58,373. 
Landmark Real Estate's net income averaged $46,256 for the involved years, 1997, 1998, 
and 1999. That is a total of $138,770. PI. Ex. 65. Yet, the jury awarded punitive damages of 
$800,000 against Landmark Real Estate. That is 576% of the net income. Clearly, the punitive 
damage awards are disproportionate to the Appellants' income and must be remanded on appeal as 
they were not set aside upon post-trial motion. 
Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that punitive damages are aimed 
at the purposes of deterrence and retribution, and that the Due Process Clause prohibits the 
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a party. See State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,417 (2003). In reviewing punitive damage 
awards, the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed courts to consider: (1) the degree of reprehensibility 
of the defendant's misconduct, (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the 
plaintiff and the punitive damage award, and (3) the difference between the punitive damages 
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Id. at 418. 
In making a determination with regard to the first consideration, a defendantls 
reprehensibility, the Supreme Court stated: 
The most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive 
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's 
conduct. We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility 
of a defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical 
as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference 
to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target 
of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved 
repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the 
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. The 
existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff 
may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the 
absence of all of them renders any award suspect. It should be 
presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries by 
compensatory damages, so punitive damages should only be awarded 
if the defendant's culpability, after paid compensatory damages, is so 
reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to 
achieve punishment or deterrence. 
Applying these factors in the instant case, we must acknowledge that 
State Farm's handling of the claims against the Campbells merits no 
praise. The trial court found that State Farm's employees altered the 
company's records to make Campbell appear less culpable. State 
Farm disregarded the overwhelming likelihood of liability and the 
near-certain probability that, by taking the case to trial, a judgment in 
excess of the policy limits would be awarded. . . . While we do not 
suggest that there was error in awarding punitive damages based upon 
State Farm's conduct toward the Campbells, a more modest 
punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the 
State's legitimate objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone 
no further. 
Id. at 419. 
Here, any harm to Kuhn or the Scheis was economic rather than physical. At no time did the 
Defendants' conduct evince an indifference or a reckless disregard for the health or safety of others. 
Additionally, this situation was an isolated incident. There was no evidence that this type of conduct 
has occurred before or since. The conduct, as found by the jury, may have resulted from intentional 
conduct rather than negligence, but it cannot be said that the Defendants' culpability is so 
reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of sanctions beyond compensatory damages. Certainly, 
a more modest punishment could have satisfied the State's legitimate objectives, 
In determining the second consideration, the disparity'between the actual or potential hafm 
suffered by plaintiffs and the punitive damage award, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
Turning to the second Gore guidepost, we have been reluctant to 
identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or 
potential ham, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award. We 
decline again to impose a bright-line ration which a punitive damage 
award cannot exceed. Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now 
established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards 
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory 
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process. In Haslip, 
in upholding a punitive damages award, we concluded that an award 
of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might 
be close to the line of constitutional impropriety. . . . 
Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive 
damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have 
previously upheld may comport with due process where "a 
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of 
economic damages. The converse is also true, however. When 
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps 
only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit 
of the due process guarantee. The precise award in any case, of 
course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances ofthe 
defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff. 
Id. at 424-425. 
Here, the compensato~y damages are substantial, $179,219.64 in favor of Kuhn against these 
Defendants and $84,483 in favor of Scheis against these Defendants. The ratio of compensatory 
damages to punitive damages is 3.1-to-1 as to Kuhn and 4.3-to-1 as to Scheis. Although these are 
single digit ratios, they are beyond the outermost limit of d~e '~rocess  due to the substantial nature 
of the compensatory damages. 
Additionally, with regard to the calculation of these ratios, it might be argued that the ratios 
are too small considering that the compensatory damages include damages attributed by the jury 'to 
a Defendant, Kelly Fisher, against whom punitive damages were not itllowed. Also, when 
approached from the Defendant Coldwell Banker's point of view, it was attributed none of the 
negligence with regard to percentage of fault, andwith regard to breach of contract, Coldwell Banker 
is not even listed. R. Vol. 11, p. 307-313. The only actual damages it appears they were responsible 
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for according to the jury is the refund of the commission paid in the amount of $1 1,825.00. See R. 
Vol. 11, p. 307-313. Yet the jury found punitive damages against Coldwell Banker in the amount of 
$800,000. As to Coldwell Banker individually, that results in a net ratio of 68-to-1. 
The Supreme Court concluded its analysis in Campbell by stating that the proper 
application of the three considerations in that case would most likely justify a punitive damages 
award at or near the compensatory damages amount. For the same reasons as those analyzed 
incampbell, the punitive damage award in this case should be no more than the compensatory 
damages amount. 
N. The District Court erred in its rulings regarding the Defendants' post-verdict motions 
Defendants filed a number of post-verdict motions in this matter. The motions were timely 
filed and called for an amendment or alteration of the judgment; a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict; a new trial; and a 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment. With the exception of a small 
reduction in award based on relative fault attributed to third parties, the district court denied all the 
motions set forth by Appellants. 
A. The DiMrict Court should have found that the evidence supported amending or altering 
the judgment pursuant to Idaho R Civ. P. 59(e). 
IRCP 59(e) allows the trial court a mechanism to correct legal or factual errors occurring 
during trial as a matter of discretion. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, (1999). As set 
out above, the Supreme Court may review whether or not the trial court in granting or denying such 
a motion, abused the discretion given it. The judgment should first be altered with regard to the 
statements made by the Scheis' attorney NormanReece. ~ e e c e  specifically told the jury at the outset 
of his closing argument that his clients were not seeking to recover any damages relating to Manning 
Lane. Re explained as follows: 
You'll note - I think Roger testitled to you he's not going to claim 
any damages from Manning Lane. He was willing to take a hit on 
Manning Lane because he felt, based on what the defendants were 
telling him, he could recoup that. 
He was willing to enter into that and take a hit on it based on what the 
defendants were telling him, but he has decided not to offer that 
into evidence for damages because he wants to make sure that 
you feel he's being honest with you because he really is. He's 
trying to tell you what his heart of hearts feels he has incurred 
because of the conduct that happened here. [Emphasis added.] 
Tr. Vol IV, p 3762,l. 23 - p. 3763,l. 10. 
Reece told the jury to not consider damages associated with Manning Lane and he made no mention 
of such damages during his closing argument. This is important because Jury Instruction No. 1 
specifically told the jury: 
The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case are 
intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the 
instructions, but they are not themselves evidence. If any argument 
or remark has no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard it. 
However, there are two exceptions to this ~ l e :  (1) an admission 
of fact by one attorney is binding on hi party; and (2) 
stipulations of fact by aU attorneys are binding on all parties. 
[Emphasis added.] 
R. Vol. II, p. 315-316. 
Scheis' counsel admitted that his clients were not seeking damages for the sale of Manning Lane. 
This admission was binding on the Scheis. Nevertheless, the. Special Verdict allowed ihi jury to 
consider damages for the sale of Manning Lane in the form of a refund of part or all of the 
commission. R. Vol. 11, p. 307-313. It is not surprising that the Special Verdict allowed the jury to 
consider the commission issue, because the admission occurred after the instructions were given. 
Nevertheless, the admission did occur and the purpose of IRCP 59(e) is to allow the trial court to 
correct this type of error, which it did not do. The Scheis testified that they paid the commission on 
Manning Lane. However, they also testified that they received the benefit of their bargain as to 
Manning Lane. They agreed to sell Manning Lane for $296,500 and they received that full amount. 
The Amended Restated Judgment must be altered or amended by deducting from the Scheis award 
the $1 1,825.00 awarded as a partial refund of the real estate commission paid by the Scheis to 
Landmark Real Estate. This error was not resolved by the trial court and now must be resolved on 
appeal. 
Additionally, the economist testified that the Scheis lost $14,875 on the Deed of Trust from 
Kuhn. Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2198, 1. 6-18. The same economist testified that Kuhn lost $14,875 on the 
Deed of Trust to Scheis. Id.3 In other words, the jury awarded the same damages twice. They paid 
Scheis for the loss of the Deed of Trust and they paid Kuhn for having to make a payment he never 
made. The Amended Judgment must be changed to deduct these monetary awards. See R. Vol. 
IV, p. 894-897. Because Kuhn never paid on the Deed of Trust, he should not be allowed to recove1 
for making the payment. Kuhn's award should have been reduced by $14,875. Again, the district 
court failed to reduce the award pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(e), and that was an abuse of 
discretion. 
B. The District Court erred in not granting Appellants' motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
Upon a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, the moving party admits the truth 
of the opposing party's evidence and every legitimate inference that can be drawn therefrom. Quick 
v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759,763-764 (1986); Brands. Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 733 (1981). 
However, the trial court must look at all the evidence which was before the jury. It is error to rule 
on a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict based solely on the non-moving party's 
evidence. See Hibbler v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007 (Ct.App. 1985). The Court must decide whether 
the evidence is of sufficient quantity and probative value such that reasonable minds could reach the 
same conclusion as the jury reached. Smith v. Praegifzes, 113 Idaho 887,890 (Ct.App. 1988). The 
evidence must be substantial and of sufficient quantity and probative value. Bates v. Seldin, 146 
Idaho 772,774 (2009). The determination of whether the evidence was sufficient to create an issue 
'The expert testified that he included as an element of damage promissory notes executed 
by both Kuhn and the Scheis to each other for the same amount. The expert testified that each 
was damaged in that amount and that the damage flowed from the transaction. 
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of fact is purely a question of law upon which the trial court makes its own ruling. Quick, 1 1 1 Idaho 
at 764. Where a claim is not supported by substantial evidence, it is error to deny a Motion for 
Judgment NOV. See generally Brand S. Corp, 102 Idaho 73 1. Here, Defendants are entitled to a 
Judgment NOV pursuant to IRCP 50(b) on either of these alternative grounds: (1) there was no 
evidence to show that the Defendants changed the documents, or lacked authority to sign the lease 
for the Kuhns; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to show that Defendants' conduct caused any 
damage to Respondents. 
(1) No evidence to show that these defendants changed the documents or lacked 
authority to sign the lease. Plaintiffs claimed that the version of Exhibit 11 retained in Dave 
Fuller's file and the version of Exhibit 11 retained in First American Title Company's file differed 
from the version of Exhibit 1 1 in Coldwell Banker's file. Dave Fuller, the mortgage broker the 
Kuhns worked through to finance the property on Manning Lane, testified that he did not know who 
gave him the version of Ex. 11 that is in his file. Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2873,l. 9-15. It could have come 
&om one of the real estate agents, one of the plaintiffs, or it could have come from Jacquie Kuhn. 
Jacquie is the person he did most of his dealings with regarding the loan on Manning Lane. Tr. Vol. 
III, p. 2906,l. 23 - p. 2907,l. 8. Teui Small testified that she did not know who altered the version 
of Ex. 11 that is in her file. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3 124,l. 16-24. Because there is no evidence of who used 
the white-out or how the modified documents got into the files of Dave Fuller and First American 
Title, Defendants are entitled to a Judgment NOV. This is particularly true in light of the fact that 
the altered documents did not change the information given to the lender. There was no double 
contracting. 
Idaho Code Section 54-2004(8) defines double contracting as: 
"Double contract" means two (2) or more written or unwritten 
contracts of sale, purchase and sale agreements, loan applications, or 
any other agreements, one of which is not made know to the 
prospective loan underwriter or the loan guarantor, to enable the 
buyer to obtain a larger loan than the true sales price would allow, or 
to enable the buyer to qualify for a loan which he or she otherwise 
could not obtain. 
Here, Dave Fuller testified that the loan application given to the lender showed that the Kuhns were 
retaining ownership of Mountain Park and leasing or renting it to the Scheis. The version of Exhibit 
11 in Fuller's file did not alter that fact in any way. It is a Purchase and Sale Agreement that does 
not mention Mountain Park. It shows that the Kuhns were buying Manning Lane and that nothing 
was being done with Mountain Park. When combined with the loan application provided to the 
underwriter, it clearly informed the lender that the Kuhns would own both properties as well as a 
third property, Rocky Point. See R. Ex. 11. 
First AmericanTitle's versionof Exhibit 1 1 reads exactly the same as the version in Coldwell 
Banker's file. White-out had been used on it, but the remaining language in Paragraph 5 has the 
exact same words as the version relied upon by the parties. Thus, the different versions of Exhibit 
11 cannot he relied upon as proving fraud or damages. 
Additionally, as will be shown later, Todd Bohn had permission from Jacquie Kuhn to sign 
the lease. This point was also an important one to Plaintiffs' case. They alleged that Todd Bohn 
signed it without permission, but there is no evidence on these issues to suggest that the Defendants 
did anything improper. See Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1372,l. 14 - p. 1373,l. 10. Todd Bohn testified that 
Jacquie authorized him to sign the lease. Tr. Vol. I, p. 256,l. 4. Judge McDermott, though, 
instructed the jury to disregard this assertion. Tr. Vol. I p. 257,1.16-17. It is undisputed that Bohn 
signed the lease the same day that Jacquie signed Kuhn's name to Ex. 6, particularly anything that 
rises to the level required for punitive damages. Defendants are entitled to a Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict because there is no evidence to dispute that Todd Bohn had permission 
from Jackie Kuhn to sign the Apartment Lease. 
(2) Insuffcient Evidence Regarding Causation. There is no evidence that any conduct or 
lack of conduct by these defendants caused damages to the plaintiffs. The Scheis claim that they 
were damaged when Mountain Park was foreclosed. Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1945,l. 8-24. However, the 
Scheis never owned Mountain Park. That foreclosure could not have gone against their credit 
record. All losses to the Scheis related to Mountain Park were related to their failure to exercise the 
option to purchase, not to any conduct by the Defendants. Therefore, the $166,000 to $189,900 of 
damages attributed to the Mowtain Park foreclosure cannot be recovered by the Scheis. Even the 
economist testified that there were multiple other factors that caused the Scheis damages regarding 
increased interest expenses and lost profits on home construction, including the loss of Mr. Schei's 
job and the fact that they were building houses that were not supported by the local market. Tr. Vol. 
111, p. 2303,l. 15 - p. 2304,l. 23. That means there was insufficient evidence to support any damages 
awarded to the Scheis for those losses. The Scheis and Kuhn both sought to recover $14,875 for the 
loss of the Deed of Trust. R. Vol. 11, p. 307-3 13; Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2198,l. 3-22; Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2209 
1. 19 - p. 2210, 1. 2. There is no evidence to support such a double payment. The only damages 
attributable to the Scheis and supported by the economist was the net payments on the Mountain 
Park lease of $27,621.00. Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2276,l. 25 - p. 2277,l. 2. No other damages can be 
awarded to the Scheis. 
Darren Kuhn claimed he was damaged when Mountain Park was foreclosed. R. Vol. I, p. 
39. However, it is undisputed that the foreclosure occurred when the Scheis failed to make their 
lease payments and Knhn failed to make his mortgage payments. There is no evidence that the 
Appellants' conduct caused those damages. Even the economist testified that if Scheis had 
performed, then Kuhn would have no damages. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2273,l. 19 - p. 2274,l. 18. The 
economist further testified that he was not giving any opinion as to causation of the damages he 
discussed. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2232,l. 11-16; p. 2235,l. 15-18. There is insufficient evidence to support 
the jury's finding that Kuhn was injured because of the Appellants' conduct. A Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict is warranted based on the complete lack of evidence of damages caused 
by the Defendants 
C. The Trial Court erred in denying Appellants' Motion for New Trial. 
Usually, as set out in the standard of review section above, the decision whether to grant a 
new trial under Rule 59 is a question of discretion for the Trial Court. See inter alia Chereny v. 
Agri-Lines, 1 15 Idaho 28 1, 286 (1988). However, as discussed below, there are certain 
circumstances that require the granting of a new trial. The rule that a verdict will not be set aside 
when supported by substantial but conflicting evidence has no application to a motion for new trial. 
See Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620,626 (1979). 
The Defendants' position on the appeal of the Motion for New Trial is that there are five 
grounds that require a new trial: (1) irregularity in the proceedings of the adverse party under Rule 
59(a)(l); (2) newly discovered material evidence under Rule 59(a)(4); (3) error in law under Rule 
59(a)(7); (4) an award of damages due to passion or prejudice under Rule 59(a)(5); and (5) an award 
of damages unsupported by the evidence under Rule 59(a)(6). The excessiveness of the punitive 
damages award was discussed above in conjunction with the argument that punitive damages should 
not have made it to the jury at all. The remaining arguments will be made below. 
(1) Irregularity in the Proceedings by the Adverse Party. When a motion for new trial 
is based upon misconduct, the moving party has only the burden to establish that the misconduct 
occurred, the party opposing the motion is then required to establish that the conduct could not have 
affected the outcome of the trial. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 71 1 (1999). An 
appellate court need not attempt to quanti@ the probability of a different result on retrial. It is 
sufficient that the error was prejudicial and that it reasonably could have affected the outcome of the 
trial. Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529,534 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Here, Respondents were guilty of misconduct in several different instances. Kuhn lied about 
his knowledge of the Robert Jones appraisal. See R. Vol. III, p. 560- 565. Darren Kuhn hid the 
location of his ex-wife fiom Defendants despite a direct interrogatory regarding the location of all 
persons with knowledge. See R. Vol. 111, p. 561; See also R. Vol. IV, p. 822-824. Darren Kuhn lied 
about his credit problems and hid documents regarding his credit history from Defendants despite 
a Request for Production for those documents. See R. Vol. III, p. 560-565. 
Darren Kuhn testified under oath that he was not aware that Robert Jones performed an 
appraisal on the Manning Lane house until it came up during the trial. Specifically, he said: 
Until learning of it in this trial, did you know that Robert 
Jones had, in fact, done - well, let me backup. You knew he 
was going to do two appraisals? 
I knew someone was supposed to do two appraisals. 
You didn't pick him? 
No. 
. . . . 
Did you play any part in picking Mr. Jones? 
No. 
But you were agreeable to rely and trust Mr. Merzlock and Mr. B o b  to make 
a judgment call as to who would be a fair and common appraiser for both 
properties? 
Yes. 
Did you at any time prior to hearing it in court, realize that the appraisal that 
Mr. Jones, in fact, came in with was $261,000? 
No. I was never told of that appraisal. 
Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3656,1.14 - p. 3658,l. 7. 
This is an obvious lie as shown by the affidavits of Jacqueline Kuhn and Kelly Kumm. 
See R. Vol. III, p. 560-565 and 574-619. Todd Bohn recoininended that the Kuhns use Robert Jones 
and they used Jones to get a low-ball appraisal. Id. at 562. When Darren Kuhn took the stand and 
testified that he knew nothing about Jones' appraisal until the trial, he lied. The fact is that he not 
only knew about that appraisal, he used it in his divorce case to undervalue the cost of the Manning 
Lane house. Darren's attorney in the divorce, Bron Rammell, provided the appraisal to Jaqueline's 
attorney, Kelly Kunun. R. Vol. 111, p. 574-576. It was misconduct for Kuhn to lie on the stand. 
Kuhn attempted to minimize and discredit the testimony provided by Jacquie and more 
specifically that of Kelly Kumm in the affidavits of Lowell Hawkes and Bron Rammel. See R. Vol. 
111, p. 854-861. The Hawkes affidavit, though, is fraught with hearsay. Defendants objected to the 
Hawkes affidavit and moved to strike it, but that motion was denied. R. Vol. IV, p. 866(c). Ityas 
abuse of discretion for the court to accept the Hawkes affidavit with all its hearsay sind in effect 
disregard the Kumm affidavit. 
One of the major problems the Defendants faced, at trial was their inability to produce 
Jacqueline Kuhn as a witness. This problem was compounded by the Court's refusal to allow the 
Defendants to testify about statements made to them by Jacqueline, which problem will be discussed 
in detail below. Appelants' inability to locate Jacqueline was due directly to discovery abuse by 
Kuhn. Defendants served discovery on Kuhn on ~ ~ r i i  25,2001. R. Vol. 111, p. 633-652. 
Interrogatory No. 1 requested that Kuhn provide the name, address, and telephone number of each 
person with knowledge of any facts of the case. Interrogatory No. 2 requested that Kuhn provide the 
name, address, and telephone number of each person he intended to call as a factual witness. Kuhn 
answered these interrogatories on July 3 1,200 1. In answering them, he identified Jacquie Kuhn as 
Jacquie Jordan (her new married name) and gave her address and telephone number as P.O. Box 
460273, Huson, Montana 59846, (406) 626-4357. Id. Jacquie moved in November of 2001 to a 
new address and telephone number. Darren had Jacquie's new address and telephone number by 
. 
November of 2001. Id. at 560-565. Under Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(e), Kuhn had an obligation to 
supplement his July 3 1,2001 answers with Jacquie's new address and telephone number. Without 
that supplementation, the Defendants had no way to know that her address and telephone number 
had been changed and mail was not being forwarded. R. Vol. 111, p. 561. Defendants had no way 
to know how to reach Jacquie. Rule 26(e) states: 
A party who has responded to arequest for discovery with a response 
that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement the 
response to include information thereafter acquired, except as 
follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement the 
response with respect to any question directly addressed to (A) 
theidentity of persons having knowledge of discoverable matterg 
and . . .  
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if the 
party obtains information upon the basis of which (A) the party 
knows that the response was incorrect when made, or (B) the party 
knows that the response though correct when made is no longer true 
and the circu~llstances are such that a failure to amend the response 
is in substance a knowing concealment. [Emphasis added.] 
Kuhn never amended his response even though he knew that it was no longer true and his failure 
to amend is in substance a knowing concealment. In addition to the affidavit produced by Jacquie, 
common sense dictates that where KuW s children spent considerable time at Jacquie's new address, 
he must have known where it was. 
Rule 26(e)(3) imposes a further duty to supplement discovery responses whenever the 
opposing party makes a new request for supplementation of prior responses. In this case, Defendants 
served a Demand for Supplementation on the Plaintiffs on ~ctober  4,2002. See R. Vol IV, p. 822- 
824. Despite this request for an update of information, Darren Kuhn remained silent as to the 
location of Jacqueline Kuhn. 
Defendants could not locate Jacquie without being privy to the information that only Kuhn 
had. The District Court, though, refused to grant the Defendants' motion for new trial due to the 
concealment. R. Vol. IV, p. 866(c). The District Court apparently found the testimony given by 
Jacquie by virtue of her affidavit unconvincing. Id While the court below has discretion due to its 
having heard the witnesses, with regard to this affidavit, the lower courl was in no better position 
to judge her veracity as are the Justices of the Idaho Supreme Court. But when newly discovered 
evidence of this nature comes after trial, through no fault of the moving party, fairness dictates 
allowing the jury to hear the new evidence and weigh it against the other testimony and evidence 
presented. 
There is further evidence of misconduct on the part of the Plaintiffs. Both the Scheis and 
Darren K& testified that Jacquie must have gotten the key to Manning Lane from Todd Bohn when 
they moved in. Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1871,l. 15-20; Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1477,l. 5-8. Once Jacquie contacted 
defense counsel, they learned that Roger Schei gave Jacquie the garage door opener. No one gave 
her a key. See R. Vol. 111, p. 563. 
Kuhn's position at trial was that he had decent credit prior to the purchase of Manning Lane 
but that the foreclosure on Mountain Park destroyed his credit. He testified that his credit would 
have gone up from a " B  rating to an "A" ratingbut for the foreclosure. Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1532,l. 13 - 
. . 
p. 1533,l. 1. In discovery, the Defendants requested that. Kuhn provide copies of all credit reports 
for himself or his business. See R. Vol. 111, p. 650. Kuhn provided a credit report for July 28, 1997 
and a credit report for June 4,2002. Id. .at 654; see also R. Exhibits 302 and ZZZZ attached to 
original transcript. These were to constitute a "before and after" snapshot of his credit- before 
buying Manning Lane and after the foreclosure. He used these two 'reports to establish his damages 
and the expert used them in making in determination of damages. See Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2245,1.16 - 
p. 2248,l. 18. However, after communicating with Jacquie Kuhn following the trial, the Defendants 
learned of a third credit report. Darren used this third report in his divorce case, but never provided 
it to Defendants in this case despite a clear and unequivocal discovery request that he do so. This 
third credit report is material because it is dated July 29, 1999, which is long after the Kuhns bought 
Manning Lane but only two months before the Scheis quit making lease payments oh Mountain Park. 
  hat credit report shows that ~ a r r e n  ~ u h n  had a "c" rating even before the foreclos& on ~ountain .  
Park. See R. Vol. 111, p. 575,585. 
Any one of these "misconducts" would have altered the outcome of this trial had they not 
occurred. Any one of them is an adequate basis for a new trial. Taken together, they resulted in a 
gross miscarriage of justice and denying Appellants' motion for a new trial was a manifest abuse of 
discretion. Defendants are entitled to a new trial under Rule 59(a)(l). 
(2) Newly Discovered Material Evidence. In Idaho, the rule is that when a party seeks a 
new trial based on newly discovered evidence, "it is essential ... that such evidence has been 
discovered since the trial and that it could not have been discovered before or during the progress 
of the trial by the exercise of due diligence." See, Idaho Judicial Council v. Becker, 122 Idaho 288, 
297 (1992) (citing Frederickson v. Lutky, 72 Idaho 164, 168 (1951)). 
The same facts that constitute misconduct constitute newly discovered material evidence in 
this case. Jacquie Kuhn's testimony was critical to Defendants' defense against the Plaintiffs' 
claims. Yet, Darren Kuhn hid Jacquie's whereabouts from the defendants or at least failed to 
disclose her whereabouts despite his duty to do so. Had Jacquie testified, she would have testified, 
consistent with her affidavit, that: 
1. She gave Todd Bohn permission to sign the apartment lease and showed that 
lease to Darren Kuhn a few days after it was signed. 
2. The Kuhns knew before they closed on Manning Lane that they were leasing 
Mt. Park to the Scheis. 
3. Roger Schei gave her the garage door opener before the closing so that the 
Kuhns could move into Manning Lane. 
4. The Kuhns knew all about Robert Jones' $261,000 appraisal on Manning 
Lane and they presented that appraisal to the Scheis to get them to come off 
of the $350,000 asking price. 
See R. Vol. LII, p. 560-565. 
Additionally, if her whereabouts had not been concealed from Defendants, the credit report would 
also have come to light. 
This new evidence was not available to Defendants prior to trial. Jacquie herself stated in 
her affidavit that both Bron Rarnmell and Darren Kuhn knew her new address prior to trial. Id. She 
further testified that she was afraid that if she testified for the Appellants at trial, Darren Kuhn would 
try to take their children away from her. Id. Due diligence would not have found this witness prior 
to trial. She was only found after trial because she contacted defense counsel. Id. Defendants are 
entitled to a new trial under Rule 59(a)(4). 
As with Kuhn's claim of ignorance regarding knowledge of the appraisal, a simple affidavit 
from Kuhn could have provided a good explanation, if there were one, of why Jacquie's whereabouts 
were kept from the Defendants and why the credit report was not provided when asked for. Whether 
Jacquie's whereabouts were kept from Kuhn's counsel or whether Kuhn's counsel kept them from 
the Appellants, there was no way due diligence would have allowed discovery of her whereabouts. 
Indeed, as there is a standing rule of civil procedure compelling a party to disclose a change of 
address and the Defendants demanded a supplementation to the discovery responses provided by 
Respondents, the standard of due diligence has been met. The Defendants should have been able 
to rely on the fact that if Kuhn knew of his ex-wife's whereabouts, he would have let them know. 
(3) Error of Law. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7) provides that the trial court may 
grant a new trial for "error in law, occurring at trial.'' The trial court has a duty to grant a new trial 
under IRCP 59(a)(7) where prejudicial errors of law have occurred, even though the verdict is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Schaefer v. Ready, 134 Idaho 378,3 P.3d 56 (Ct. 
App. 2000). 
Here, there were three errors of law that prejudiced these defendants. First, the Court erred 
by not applying the Statute of Frauds to the Respondents' claim that the parties entered into an 
agreement whereby Defendants would buy Mt. Park if it had not sold within one year.4 Second, the 
Court erred by allowing Plaintiffs to call an expert witness to discuss whether the Defendants' 
conduct was in violation of the appropriate standard of care.s Third, the Court erred by not allowing 
Defendants to testify as to statements made to them by Jacqueline Kuhn. 
Idaho Code § 9-505 states that an agreement is invalid, unless it is in writing and signed by 
the party charged and evidence of the agreement cannot he received without the writing, when that 
agreement "by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof. . . or [is] an 
agreement . . . for the sale, of real property." Darren Kuhn took the position as testified by his 
attorney BronRammell that there was an agreement between his attorney, Bron Rammell, and Kelly 
Fisher that Coldwell Banker would buy Mountain Park if it did not sell within one year. Ti-. Vol. 11, 
p. 1640,l. 2-15. Roger Schei claimed that John Merzlock made the same promise to him. Tr. Vol. 
4Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint makes no reference to this alleged contract. Therefore, 
Defendants' Answer does not raise the Statute of Frauds as an affirmative defense. However, the 
issue was tried to the jury and a motion to conform the pleadings was granted. 
'That argument has already been taken up in Section I1 above. 
111, p. 2388, 1. 1-10. This testimony was objected to by Defendants as being in violation of the 
Statute of Frauds and should never have been heard by the jury. See Tr. Vol. 11, p. 163 1 1.12 - 1638, 
1.23. There should have been no evidence allowed as to this agreement due to Idaho Code § 9-505 
for two different reasons. First, by the very nature of the agreement, performance of it cannot have 
taken place within one year. Coldwell Banker's obligation in the agreement cannot have arisen 
within a year, so its performance cannot possibly take place within that same year. Additionally, 
though this is a contingent agreement, it is still an agreement for the sale of real estate. The statute 
of frauds should clearly have kept evidence of this agreement out for both of those reasons. Once 
the Court allowed the testimony to go to the jury, Defendants submitted a proposed jury instmction 
that set forth the Statute of Frauds. See R. Vol. 11, p. 302. The Court's refusal'to give that 
instruction further compounded the error on this issue. 
Several times during trial, Defendants attempted to testify regarding statements made to them 
by Jacqueline Kuhn. See discussion infra Part V. Plaintiffs claimed that such statements were 
hearsay. Defendants argued, as will be discussed below, that they were admissions by a party- 
opponent. Darren Kuhn testified that he gave Jackie authority to enter into contracts in his name. 
She was acting as his agent throughout the events that led to this lawsuit. See discussion supra Part 
IV.B.1. Under Rule 801(2), the Court,erred in not allowing the Defendants to testify regarding 
statements made by Jacquie. Improper admission of evidence is a proper ground for a new trial 
under Rule 59(a)(l). See, Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529 (Ct. App. 1989). Consequently, the 
improper exclusion of admissible evidence should also be aproper ground for anew trial under Rule 
59(a)(l). The trial court has a duty to grant anew trial where prejudicial errors of law have occurred, 
even thoughthe verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Schaefer v. Ready, 134 
Idaho 378,380 (Ct. App. 2000). Defendants are entitled to a new trial because of the errors of law 
set out above. 
(4) Amount of Damages Due to Passion or Prejudice. When making a Rule 59(a)(5) 
motion for new trial, the moving party is not required to point to the record and demonstrate 
some particular occurrence which creates jury passion or prejudice. Dineen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 
620,624 (1979); Stewart v. Rice, 120 Idaho 504,508 (1991). Instead, the Trial Court must 
weigh the evidence, determine the amount it would have awarded, compare that amount with the 
jury's award, and determine whether the disparity between the two awards is so great it shocks 
the conscience of the Court. Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848,853 (1992). The rule that the 
verdict will not be set aside even when supported by substantial but conflicting evidence has no 
bearing on a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a)(5). Dineen, 100 Idaho at 624. Even if the 
jury's verdict is supported by substantial, competent evidence, a new trial should be granted if 
the jury verdict is excessive and the disparity between the two awards shocks the conscience. 
Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609,615 (1986). 
The issue is not whether there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jmy's verdict. 
Instead, the issues are whether it is apparent that there is a great disparity between the two damage 
awards and whether that disparity can be explained away simply as the product of two separate 
entities valuing the proof of injuries in two equally fair ways. See Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 
850-51 (1992); Quick, 11 1 Idaho at 769. If the trial judge believes that the jury's verdict resulted 
from passion or prejudice, then he should grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(5). Pratton, 122 Idaho 
at 851. Of course, if a trial court has abused its discretion,' the appropriate appellate court must 
overturn the decision. 
The standard to be followed by a Trial Court when faced with a Rule 59(a)(5) motion was 
established in Dineen: 
A trial court in a jury trial hears exactly the same evidence as the jury 
hears, and makes his own inward assessments of credibility and 
weight. So, when after a trial the jury returns a verdict which is 
thereafter assailed, either as excessive or as inadequate, the trial 
court's judgment is then called into play, requiring of him a weighing 
of the evidence. The sole question on a Rule 59(a)(5) motion is the 
amount of the jury's damage award, as compared to the amount of 
damages the trial court on his view of the evidence would have 
awarded. Where the disparity is so great as to suggest, but not 
necessarily establish, that the award is what might be expected of a 
jury acting under the influence of passion or prejudice, the court will 
in the interests ofjustice grant a new trial. . . . [Emphasis in original.] 
Dineen, 100 Idaho at 624-25. The Court in Collins v. Jones,'13 1 Idaho 556 (1998), confirmed the 
trial court's "duty to weigh the evidence and make an assessment of the credibility and weight of that 
evidence." Collins, 13 1 Idaho at 558. 
The Dineen standard was re-affirmed in Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848 (1992): 
It is now well established that when a motion for a new trial is 
premised on inadequate or excessive damages, the trial court must 
weigh the evidence and then compare the jury's award to what he 
would have given had there beenno jury. If the disparity between the 
two amounts is so great that it appears that the award was givenunder 
the influence of passion or prejudice, a new trial should be granted. 
This is a subjective standard - the granting or denial of the new trial 
is premised on the trial judge's belief that the inadequacy or 
excessiveness of the award resulted from passion or prejudice. 
Pratton, 122 Idaho at 852. 
In Quick v. Crane, 11 1 Idaho 772,727 P.2d 1200 (1986), the Supreme Court added the 
requirement that the trial court must state its reasons for granting or denying aRule 59(a)(5) motion: 
An appellate court should not focus primarily upon the outcome of 
the discretionary decision below, but upon the process by which the 
trial judge reached his decision. In order for the appellate court to 
perform this function properly, it must be informed of the reasons for 
the court's decision. Unless those reasons are obvious from the 
record itself, they must be stated by the trial judge. 
Quick, 1 1  1 Idaho at 772. Finally, in Pratton, the Court explained how the trial court could 
adequately state its reasons: 
It is not sufficient, however, to merely recite the language of the 
statute. While the trial court is not required to state the dollar amount 
it would have awarded, the ruling must show that the trial court has 
weighed the evidence, determined the amount he would have 
awarded, compared that amount with the jury's award, and found the 
disparity so great that it shocks the conscience of the court. [Citations 
omitted.] 
Pratton, 122 Idaho at 853. 
Here, the jury awarded Scheis a total of $453,163.18 and Darren Kuhn a total of 
$748,746.68. That is $1,201,909.90 for a case involving two houses that combined are only worth 
$471,500.00. It is clear, on its face, that the jury's decision was based on passion or prejudice rather 
than the evidence. The jury verdict should not be .allowed to stand. The disparity between what was 
awarded and what should have been awarded is so great, it shocks the conscience. 
Despite all this, the court denied the motion and gave the following as reasoning for such 
denial: 
To grant a new trial due to passion or prejudice the Court must weigh 
the evidence, determine what amount it would have awarded, and 
determine whether the disparity between the two is so great as to 
shock the conscience of the Court. 
The Court finds that in weighing the evidence that there would not 
have been such a disparity between what the Court would have 
awarded and what was awarded by the jury to be so great that the 
difference could only be explained that the jury's award was based on 
passion, prejudice or that it would have shocked the conscience of the 
Court. 
R. Vol. IV, p. 866(i). 
This is not a sufficient justification for denying the motion, nor is there a good reason for its denial. 
It was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
(5) Award Unsupported by Evidence. On a motion for new trial pursuant to IRCP 
59(a)(6), the trial court may grant a newtrial when it is satisfied the verdict is not supported by the 
evidence or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of evidence. Blaine v. 
Byers, 91 Idaho 665,671 (1967); Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 852 (1992). The standard is 
similar to the standard for Judgment NOV and the insufficiencies in the evidence discussed above 
relative to a Judgment NOV apply here. The clear weight' of the evidence admitted at trial does not 
. . 
supporl thejury verdict. The damages were caused when the Scheis quit paying their lease payments 
and Kuhn failed to make his mortgage payments. For all of these reasons, Appellants are entitled to 
a new trial pursuant to IRCP 59(a). 
D. The Dktrict Court erred in its Rulings regarding Appellants' Motion for Relief 
pursuant to Zduho R Civ. P. 60(b). 
Rule 60(b) authorizes the Court to set aside ajudgment for fraud, if the motion is filed within 
six months of the date of judgment. For both of these reasons, Appellants sought for, but were 
denied relief pursuant to this rule. The court's ruling on that matt& was error. Rule 60(b)(3) allows 
the Court to set aside the Judgment if there has been fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct 
of an adverse party and the motion to set. aside is filed within 6 months of the judgment. Rule SO(b) 
also allows the Court to set aside the Judgment if there has been fraud upon the Court and an 
independent action to set aside is filed within 1 year of the judgment. Thus, Rule 60(b) covers two 
different types of fraud, fraud against a party by the adverse p&y or fraud upon the court by . anyone. . 
The term "fraud upon the Court" is more than just interparty misconduct. In Idaho it has 
been held to require more than perjury or misrepresentation by a party. See, Compton v. Compton, 
101 Idaho 328,334 (1980). In Compton, the Court held that such fraud "will only be found in the 
presence of such tampering with the administration of justice as to suggest a wrong against the 
institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public." Compton, 101 Idaho, at 334. In discussing 
what type or amount of fraud is sufficient to justify setting aside the judgment, the Compton Court 
stated: 
We agree that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud is 
simply another way of phrasing the question, and is of limited utility 
in actually resolving it. The task remains to strike a balance between 
two competing interests. On the one hand rests the need for finality 
of actions. On the other is the decidedly unsavory "spectacle of the 
law bearing down mercilessly, and perhaps ruinously, to collect and 
deliver over the fruits of undoubted fraud. Invoking oversimplified 
- 
definitional concepts does not materially aid in accomplishing this 
task. [Citations omitted.] 
In a more recent case, Golder v. Golder, 110 Idaho 57 (1986), the Court described the balancing of 
competing interests as the need for finality ofjudgments vs. justice - the courts' reluctance to serve 
as a shield in the perpetration of a fraud. 
In Artiach Trucking v. Wolters, 118 Idaho 656 (Ct.App. 1990), the Court of Appeals 
addressed a claim of fraud based upon Wolter's claim that Artiach Trucking engaged in subterfuge 
during discovery. Artiach Trucking had loaned money to a corporation in return for two mortgages, 
one on land in Oregon and the other on land in Idaho. The Idaho land had been deeded to the debtor 
on the mortgage by the Wolters. The debtor disappeared with the money andwithout repaying the 
loans. Artiach brought suit in Idaho to foreclose on the property located in Idaho. It also brought 
suit in Oregon to foreclose on the property located there. In discovery in the Idaho case, the Wolters 
asked Artiach about the Oregon lawsuit. Wolters and Artiach reached a stipulated judgment on the 
Idaho lawsuit, but Wolters later moved to set aside that juagment, alleging that Artiach's discovery 
responses were fraudulent. The Court stated: 
The Wolters contend thatthere was subterfuge by Artiach's attorney 
in not adequately informing the Wolters, after being served with 
interrogatories, of the possibility of recovery on the Oregon property. 
The Wolters assert that had they known that Artiach ultimately had 
been able to achieve some recoveryin Oregon, they would never have 
settled with Artiach for the sums in the stipulated judgment. 
We do not believe these circumstances create the fraud or 
misrepresentation envisioned in Rule 60(b). The responses to the 
Wolters' interrogatories may have been inadequate, in the Wolters' 
view, but they were not fraudulent. Our examination of the record 
reveals that Artiach's interrogatory answers, although less than 
perfect, nevertheless provided the Wolters with access to all the 
information they eventually used to bring this motion. The 
interrogatories, together with Artiach's informal communications, 
told the Wolters the name of the Oregon connsel, the location of the 
property, the venue of the Oregon litigation, and the existence of a 
prior first mortgage on the property. One interrogatory answer told 
them the Oregon action was "proceeding in the normal course." If the 
Wolters had followed up on the answer, they could have obtained all 
the information that was subsequently revealed to them and on which 
they brought this motion. 
Id. at 658. 
The Court also looked at Wolters' claim that Artiach's failure to supplement its discovery responses 
constituted fraud. The Court held that Artiarch had no duty under Rule 26(e) to supplement its 
responses to the interrogatories. The responses were not incorrect when made and the failure to 
amend did not constitute a knowing concealment. However, there was no claim by Wolters of any 
change in the identity or location of persons having knowledge. Therefore, Rule 26(e)(l)(A) was 
not involved. 
In the instant case, Rule 26(e)(l)(A) is clearly involved. Kuhn responded to Defendants' 
interrogatory regarding persons with knowledge by giving us the name, address, and telephone 
number of Jacquie Kuhn. Darren Kubn knew she moved and'knew her new location and telephone 
number. However, he never supplemented his discovery responses, even though the rule required 
him to and even though Defendants served a demand for supplementation. See discussion supra, 
part W.C. This case differs from Artiach in that Kuhn's failure to supplement is a knowing 
concealment and is a violation of Rule 26(e). 
Rule 60(b)(3) are designed to prevent injustice. There is no question that Darren 
Kubn committedperjury, hid evidence and information about a material witness, and hid information 
about his credit rating. See discussion supra, part 1V.C. It also appears that Mr. Rammell knew 
about the missing credit report, after all he used it in the divorce proceeding. See R. Vol. 111, p. 574- 
620. He knew that Jackie had moved and he knew her new telephone number and address by 
November of 2001. See R. Vol. 111, p. 560-565. Despite that knowledge, he let his client answer 
discovery without disclosing the information or documents and he let his client give perjured 
testimony. The trial court's ruling on this matter must be reversed for fraud upon the court and upon 
the adverse party. 
I/: The Dhtrict Court erred in a number of it3 Evidentiay Rulings. 
As already discussed above, the district court erred in its ruling with regard to allowing 
Respondents' expert to testify as to whether or not the Defendants' conduct was outrageous. 
Additionally, it was error to not allow witnesses to testify as to statements made by Jacquie Jordan, 
as an agent of Plaintiff, Darren Kuhn. Defendants argued that such statements were admissions by 
a party-opponent. The Court ruled otherwise and stated that if we wanted Jacquie's testimony, we 
should have produced her as a witness6 Tr. Vol.1, p. 254,l. 8 - 258,l. 1. Indeed, despite all the 
foregoing with regard to Jacquie's whereabouts; Mr. Hawkes remarked that "she is available" as if 
Defendants could have simply contacted her for testimony. He said "This is [sic] lady who was 
available. She is available for by [sic] en [sic] they'll [sic] available for deposition albeit outside 
Montana." Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2886,l. 18-20. As discussed above, however, she was not available. Her 
whereabouts were kept from Defendants despite an affirmative request for supplementation and 
despite a duty to supplement under the rules. Idaho Rule of ~"idence, Rule 801 defines admissions 
by a party-opponent: 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against 
a party and is . . . (C) a statement by a person authorized by a party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by a 
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment of the servant or agent, made during the 
existence of the relationship, . . .. 
The Court even instructed the jury that one spouse is the agent of the other spouse for purposes of 
signing contracts and agreements which convey or encumber real property of the marital community. 
6As discussed above, this was not possible considering that Plaintiffs did not disclose her 
whereabouts to Defendants. 
See R. Vol. 11, p. 335. The Idaho Supreme Court has longstanding precedence indicating that "a 
husband may constitute his wife his agent and render her acts, within the scope of her apparent 
authority, binding on him." Carron v. Guido, 54 Idaho 494 (1934); See also First See. BankofIdaho 
v. Hansen, 107 Idaho 472 (1984). The affidavit of Jacquie Kuhn indicates that she was given 
authority to act as her husband's agent. She indicates: 
I was actively involved in the purchase of the house at 13235 
Manning Lane and in the lease of the house at 712 Mountain Park. . 
. . I handled most of the transaction because Darren was gone so 
much. However, I kept Darren informed of what was going on and 
I had his approval on everything I did. . . . Darren was out of town on 
August 18, 1997, when I signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
that is dated 8-18-97 and which bears the ID# 188424. I signed 
Darren's name to that Agreement, as I often signed his name to 
documents when he was out of town. I had his permission to sign 
that agreement and to do what I felt was necessary to facilitate the 
purchase of Manning Lane. 
R.Vol. III, page 562. 
Further, Kuhn admits he gave Jacquie authority to sign his name on his behalf. One of the 
primary arguments relied upon by the Plaintiffs was that Todd Bohn lacked authority to sign Exhibit 
7 on behalf of the Kuhns. However, the evidence was undisputed that Jacquie Kuhn acted as 
Darren's agent in much of this transaction. See Tr. Vol. I1 p. 1515,l.l - p. 1517,l. 10. She signed 
his name to contracts when he was out of town. Jury InstructionNo. 19 specifically informed the 
jury that a spouse can be the agent of the other spouse. Darren Kuhn testified that he gave his wife 
authority to sign his name and to enter into real property contracts in his behalf. Specifically, he 
testified: 
Q. Jackie signed your name to Exhibit 5? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And she did that on August 5"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And she did that without you ever having seen Exhibit 5, 
didn't she? 
Yes. 
Why would she sign your name to that document? 
Because it was during the day and I was out of town. 
Did she have your permission to sign it? 
She called me on the phone. 
Okay. So she had your permission? 
Yes. 
Look at Exhibit 6, that's not your signature either, is it? 
No. 
Jackie again signed your name to that document? 
Yes. 
Were you out of town again? 
I'm sure I was. 
Did she have your permission to sign your name to Exhibit 6? 
Yes. 
What is the date on August 6"? 
Obviously, August 6th. 
I'm sorry - everyyear- what's the date on Exhibit 6? 
August 18". 
And that's the same date as the apartment lease was signed, isn't it? 
Yes. 
Look at Exhibit 7 - August 18"; right? 
Oh, when it was signed, yes. 
So Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7 were both signed on August 1 8th and you were out 
of town that day? 
Yes. 
And you had given Jackie permission to sign Exhibit 6? 
Yes. 
So she signed Exhibit 6 the same day that Todd signed on your behalf on the 
lease; right? 
It appears that way. 
And you heard Todd's testimony that he had Jackie's permission to do that, 
didn't you? . . 
I heard that. 
Now, you weren't even there when Exhibit 6 was signed; correct? 
No. 
So you don't know'what took place then? 
No. 
Tr., Vol. 11, p. 1515,1.1 - p. 1517,l. 10. 
That admission is tantamount to an admission that she was acting as his agent. Exhibits 5, 
6, and 7 were all signed by Jacquie on Kuhn's behalf while he was out of town. Tr. Vol. 11, p. 15 14, 
1. 22 - p. 1516, 1. 22. And that admission c q e  during the course of the trial. That means that 
statements made by her are, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 801, admissions by aparty opponent 
and are admissible. The statements made by Jacquie Kuhn in her affidavit concern the sale of the 
houses, which was encompassed in the authority Kuhn gave her. Those statements, if allowed, 
would have provided the jury with much additional evidence and almost surely would have affected 
the verdict it rendered. However, when Defendants attempted to testify regarding statements made 
by Jacquie to them, they were ruled out as hearsay despite the aforementioned Rule of Evidence: 
Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2886, 1. 3 - p. 2887, 1. 10. The exclusion of those statements created an unfair 
situation and their exclusion was clearly improper. 
The next error made by the court with regard to evidentiary issues has to do with the 
exclusion of the testimony of Les Lake. Following much of the procedure alleged by the Scheis and 
Kuhn, the Scheis filed a complaint with the Idaho Red Estate Commission. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3096, 
1. 9-12. Mr. Lake was commissioned to investigate the complaint. Id. The court did not allow the 
witness to testify before the jury. The original objection lodged by Mr. Hawkes in this case was with 
regard to a letter Mr. Lake issued in response to .the complaint finding that the agents had done 
nothing wrong. As the offer of proof showed, Mr. Lake would have testified consistently with the 
letter. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3093,1.2 - p. 3099,1.6. . . 
There is no justification for not allowing Mr. LAke to testify as to the investigation he 
performed. Indeed, Mr. Hawkes admitted earlier in the proceedings that, while the letter is hearsay, 
aperson's testimony as to the investigation should be admissible. He, himself, explained "well, the 
letter, of course, isn't admissible by itself. It's a hearsay document, but I think they can bring people 
to address the same issue . . . . but I agree your Honor, that they would be permitted to bring in 
somebo'dy who could be cross-examined. A piece of paper can't." Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2476,l. 16 - p. 
2477,l. 4. Additionally, the court stated at more than one point, that the Letter must be admitted on 
principles of fairness if Respondents' expert was allowed to testify. Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1933,l. 3-8. She 
was allowed to testify, but the letter was not allowed into evidence even through its author. Tr. Vol. 
11, p. 1933, I. 3-8. 
And yet, when Mr. Lake was brought in to testify, Mr. Hawkes did object. His objection, 
though, changed from hearsay issues to arguing that he did not know to what Mr. Lake would be 
testifying. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3 104,l. 5-21. This objection, though convoluted appears to reference 
some lack of disclosure of items or information relied upon in performing the investigation. But if 
there was something lacking in the investigation performed by Mr. Lake, Mr. Hawkes could certainly 
have exposed that on cross-examination. He could have deposed the witness as well as Mr. Lake 
was disclosed by the Defendants as a witness. In addition, the door was opened in opening 
statements when counsel for the Scheis alleged that the conduct of the Defendants was grounds for 
revocation oftheir real estate licenses. Tr. Vol. I, p. 134,l. 15-20. Certainly, the Defendants should 
have been allowed to rebut that assertion with the facts that there was an investigation and their 
licenses were not revoked. 
The court never really gave its reasoning for disallowing the testimony or the letter. Judge 
McDermott simply indicates he is trying to follow the rules. Tr. Vol IV, p. 3108,l. 21-24. There 
is no definite explanation a s  to why the witness was to be excluded completely though there is some 
mention of relevance. Tr. Vol IV, p. 3099,l. 11-14. That Mr. Lake's testimony as an investigating 
agent into the conduct of real estate agents against whom there is alleged negligence and a breach 
of their fiduciary duty, is not relevant, is unfathomable. "Relevant Evidence" is defined as "evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Idaho R. Ev. 
401. Considering the number of alleged misdeeds, the testimony of an investigating body of what 
it did to investigate the matter and what it found as a result of its investigation, would have great 
bearing on how the jury sees the alleged deeds of misconduct. Mr. Lake also spoke with the Scheis, 
ToddBohn, Kelly Fisher, and John Merzlock, but his testimony as to those conversations, much of 
which would have been admissible as non-hearsay admissions by party opponents was excluded. 
All of these evidentiary rulings are error and none are harmless. The court's errors in this 
regard were abuses of discretion and in some instances, as with regard to Mr. Lake's testimony, the 
court gave virtually no explanations as to why it was ruling the way it did. Each of the above errant 
evidentiary rulings are grounds for a reversal and a remand for a new trial. 
VI. The District Court erred in its Rulings Regarding Jury Instructions given and those 
refused along with the Special Verdict F o m  
This brief has already detailed the reasons why the statute of frauds should have kept any 
evidence of the alleged agreement between Kelly Fisher and Bron Rammell, regarding the purchase 
of the property by Coldwell Banker, away from the jury's ears. See discussion supra part IV.C.3. 
That same reasoning applies to why the lower court erred in not allowing a jury instruction with 
regard to the statute of frauds. 
The statute of frauds was obviously applicable and, if the court was going to overrule the 
Defendants' objection as to evidence set forth regarding this alleged agreement, it certainly should 
have at least provided the jury with an instruction for the statute of frauds. This was a clear error of 
law. The Defendants' proposed jury instruction number 19 was not included in the court's final jury 
instructions. Counsel objected to the exclusion of the instruction and the inclusion of the instruction 
regarding contracts in general without the caveat of the statute of frauds. Tr. Vol. IV, p: 3689,l. 8- 
21. The court responded to the objection by saying the following: 
The testimony was that- there was allegedly an agreement, but it's 
disputed. But Mr. Rammell reduced it to writing and sent it over to 
Kelly Fisher and it never was signed. 
I don't think under all the facts of this case, I don't think giving an 
instruction on Statute of Frauds would be appropriate. It think it 
would just confuse and mislead the jury, but your objection is noted. 
Id. at p. 3689,l. 22 - p. 3690,l. 6. 
This is not an issue of discretion. Where the statute of frauds was in issue, it was clear error not to 
give the jury an instruction on it. The court's failure to give an instruction certainly had something 
to do with the result returned by the jury with regards to the breach of contract. Indeed, in closing 
argument, the attorney for the Scheis reminded the jury that the Scheis were ffom a generation "who 
were raised with the ethic that a person's word is their bond, an ethic that you didn't need a promise 
to be in writing, your word and a handshake were enough." Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3866,l. 9-12. Whatever 
the Scheis may feel about the value of a promise, the law dictates that a promise like the one in 
question (which was only allegedly made) be made in writing or it is not enforceable and the judge 
ignored it. 
Finally, the special verdict form provided by the court to the jury in this matter is convoluted 
and confusing. After going through whether or not there was negligence with regard to each of the 
Defendants except for Coldwell Banker, and setting out what percentage of fault should be assigned 
to each Defendant except for Coldwell Banker, question 13 includes Coldwell Banker in the total 
damages for breach of a fiduciary duty and negligence. R. Vol. II, p. 3 11. This with no percentage 
of fault assigned to them. 
Additionally, it allows for double recovery where the damages are one and the same. The 
damages for a breach of contract in not buying the house when it could not be sold pursuant to the 
alleged oral agreement, are the same as a negligence claim or breach of fiduciary duty. The special 
verdict form allowed for double recovery. Further, atthough Coidwell Banker is not listed in 
questions 17 and 18 of the special verdict form for the jury to make a decision as to whether it 
breached a contract with Kuhn or the Scheis, yet the fmal judgment gave the Plaintiffs a claim 
against Coldwell Banker for the amount the jury awarded against all the other Defendants for breach 
of contract. See R. Vol. IV, p. 895. Even the judge apparently could not decipher the verdict form. 
L The Award of Attorney's Fees is Improper and the Amount Awarded Plantiffs in 
this Matter is Unreasonable and should be reversed 
The court in this matter awarded attorney's fees on the basis of the contract pursuant lo Idaho 
R. Civ. P. 54(e). The court found no statutoly basis for the award of attorney fees in this case. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs cannot establish a contractual right to attorney fees in this case. The 
Supreme Court has stated the following about the award of attorney fees: 
While I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) grants costs to a litigant who is the 
'prevailing party,' this Court has held that we adhere to the so-called 
'American rule,' which holds that, except forsanctions and the 
private attorney general doctrines, attorney fees are created only by 
statute or contract, and that Rule 54(e) neither creates a right to 
attorney fees, nor diminishes any right created by statute or contract. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1)-(5); Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571,682 P.2d 
524 (1984); Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Ufil. Comm'n , 102 
Idaho 744,750,639 P.2d 442,448 (1981)('1Alttornev fees cannot be 
recovered in an action unless authorized bv statute or bv express 
aereement of h e  parties. Kidwell v. Fenley, 96 Idaho 534,53 1 P.2d 
1179 (1975).'). (~mphasis added.) 
Farm Credit of Spokane v. Wissel, 122 Idaho 565, 569 (fn 4) (1992). Therefore, as there is no 
statutoly basis for the award of attorney fees in this case, the Scheis and Kuhn were.reduced to 
having to establish an express contractual agreement for the payment of attorney fees in order to 
prevail on this claim. 
The court at the suggestion of the Scheis and Kuhn erroneously rely on the Exclusive.Seller 
Representation Agreements for the provision of an award of attorney fees. However, as above 
explained Kuhn and Schei simply did not assert that these Defendants breached their representation 
agreements to the jury, they asserted that these Defendants breached some alleged oral agreements 
to sell the Mountain Park property within a certain period of time, to purchase the Mountain Park 
property in the event that it did not sell within one year from the lease option agreement, and to 
indemnify the Kuhns. There was certainly no mention of anexpress agreement for the payment of 
attorney fees in these alleged oral agreements. Although the Defendants maintain that these oral 
agreements should not have even been pesented to the jury, the ~che is  and ~ u h n  coksistently argued 
that these Appellants violated the oral agreements. Therefore, as there was never any agreement for 
the payment of attorney fees by the Defendants, this Court should deny the Plaintiffs' request for 
attorney fees. 
The amount of attorney's fees awarded to Kuhn and the Scheis is wholly unreasonable. Mr. 
R a m e l  was the attorney of record until he was disqualified because he became a witness. As Mr. 
Rammel failed to seek alternate counsel for his client at an earlier date, he added unnecessary and 
unreasonable sums to the attorney fees in this case. He should have known, given that his testimony 
is the one that gives rise to the alleged oral agreement, that he would have been a witness. The court 
has ordered that Appellants pay Mr. Hawkes catch up time, though he should have been involved 
in the case at the outset. 
Furthermore, as this Court disqualified Mr. Ramnell from trying this case, it is improper to 
award his duplicative attorney fees. Mr. Rammell has charged the Appellants for all his time sitting 
next to Lowell Hawkes during the trial despite the fact that he was disqualified from representing 
Kuhn. Indeed, the court made it clear during the course of the proceeding that he was not an attorney 
here, but rather a witness. At one point, outside the presence of the jury, when Mr. Rammell was 
a witness, he attempted to make alegal argument while siding on the stand. The following then took 
place: 
THE WITNESS (Mr. Rammel): I just wanted to point out that I don't think it would be 
appropriate- they turned me into a witness in this case and they don't like what they found 
out, and I mean, that's what they get and - 
THE COURT: Well, hold it, okay, what they're going to get is - 
MR. HAWKES: Let's just go on, Bron. 
THE COURT: You're a witness, not an advocate, and what they're going to get is your 
testimony under oath, okay? 
WITNESS (Mr. Rammel): Absolutely. 
Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1638,1,9-21. 
The court in one breath makes it quite clear that Mr. Rammel is not a lawyer in this matter, and in 
the next agrees to compensate him as one for his "work" during the trial. 
It is further interesting to note the difference in time and hourly rates charged by Mr. 
Rammell and Mr. Reece. Despite that fact Mr. Reece had at least as much or more experience than 
Mr. Rammell and had been involved in this case almost as long as Mr. Rammell, his time was only 
423.40 hours and his rate was only $100.00 per hour. R. Vol. 11, p. 459. Bron logged 545.5 hours 
at $150.00 per hour. R. Vol. 111, p. 525. Clearly the amounts sought by Mr. Hawkes and Mr. 
Rammell are duplicative and unreasonable and should not be awarded as requested. 
CONCLUSION 
Many, if not each of the reasons stated above are sufficient to reverse this matter and remand 
it for a new trial. However, when taken in their entirety, there should no doubt that the errors of the 
court and the misconduct ofthe Plaintiffs along with the newly discovered evidence through no fault 
of the Appellants constitute more than enough grounds for a reversal. For those reasons, the 
Appellants in this matter respectfully request that this Court find that the District Court made 
reversible errors and that the matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. Fairness 
dictates such a result. 
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